| Over the last six years because of his commitment | | | | skeptical populace but now he faces a hostile |
| to the US to help the US to combat terrorism and | | | | populace. Therefore, he requires serious political help. |
| fundamentalism after the 9/11 tragedy, Pakistan | | | | Musharraf has not only knotted himself but also |
| President Pervez Musharraf has lost the support of | | | | placed the U.S. in an awkward situation. With |
| not only the fundamentalists but also the nationalist | | | | terrorists still operating with impudence in Pakistan, |
| elements in Pakistan. Islamic fundamentalists and | | | | and Afghanistan being still very fragile, the U.S. can |
| isolationists have targeted the government and him | | | | not walk away from Pakistan. |
| regularly. The escalating violence and chaos has | | | | But then how can the U.S. justify its relationship with |
| weakened Pakistan immeasurably. | | | | Pakistan when the most compelling reason for |
| And now, with the imposition of emergency and | | | | intervention in Iraq (and potentially in Iran) is creation |
| suspension of the Constitution, President Musharraf | | | | of democratic societies in the Middle-East? |
| has also cast away any support and sympathy from | | | | Musharraf's actions seriously challenge and undermine |
| liberals, internationalists, and secularists. | | | | President Bush's arguments regarding diffusion of |
| With one stroke by imposing emergency rule, | | | | democratic values in the Middle-East. |
| President Musharraf has trapped himself and Pakistan | | | | In a more tactical view, violence, uncertainty and |
| in sand box. Musharraf is ad hoc and uncertain in his | | | | stress caused by the extra-constitutional actions of |
| beliefs and actions - showing all signs of a confused | | | | Musharraf will have a direct impact on the elimination |
| man. | | | | of terrorism and terrorists. There are three |
| Under pressure from the U.S and others, Musharraf | | | | immediate consequences. First, Pakistan's police and |
| assures the country that the parliamentary elections | | | | military resources will be diverted to maintaining the |
| will be held in February - this time table is not one bit | | | | emergency rule. Second, the extra-constitutional |
| credible given that the constitution has been | | | | actions have created such resentment and anger |
| suspended, the Supreme Court has been dismantled, | | | | among the populace that the society is now more |
| the opposition leaders have been arrested or have | | | | than ever fertile for subversive activities by |
| not been allowed to participate in Pakistan's polity. | | | | terrorists. |
| And then immediately places the opposition leader | | | | Musharraf's strategy of creating the impression that |
| Benazir Bhutto under house arrest, and releases her. | | | | he alone is capable of holding Pakistan together, and |
| Part of Musharraf's shifting moods, is his | | | | combat terrorism has lost its currency now. |
| announcement that the emergency rule will continue | | | | Musharraf's rule will come to end, inevitably so, |
| for only about a month. | | | | sooner or later. But Musharraf's actions should not |
| Musharraf is rationalizing his decisions depending on | | | | cloud Pakistan's future. |
| the pressures and stresses of the moment but | | | | President Bush and the U.S. are in very difficult |
| underlying all this is one simple intent: to somehow | | | | situation. There is the fight against terrorism and |
| legitimize his election as the President and continue to | | | | search for terrorists (large number of them are |
| hold on to power. | | | | operating from the Northwest frontier of Pakistan), |
| Musharraf does not have a face-saving exit strategy. | | | | there is the fragile Afghanistan, and there is the value |
| That's the tragedy. If Musharraf had slowly | | | | of a long-term strategic partner with Pakistan. But |
| transitioned to a more shared mode of governance | | | | none of this will be served by propping Musharraf |
| and responsibility, he would have been in better | | | | though that would be tempting - the U.S. and its |
| position politically and strategically. In this case, | | | | goals will be far better served if some uncertainty of |
| Musharraf could have placed some of the failures of | | | | popular representation is accepted instead of relying |
| governance on his political partners, and possibly | | | | on the certainty of Musharraf. |
| secured better cooperation from the various | | | | Most importantly, President Bush will lose the |
| constituencies. Even before the imposition of | | | | legitimacy of his core arguments for intervention in |
| emergency rule, Musharraf was facing a deeply | | | | Iraq and mobilization against Iran. |